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IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF: 
LYMAN W. HEMMERT, 
aka, L. W. HEMMERT, 
Deceased. 
ROSE NAGY HEMMERT, 
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and 
ALONNA COOK, 
Personal Representative 
and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is 
contested. 
It is acknowledged that the Utah Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction over final orders, judgments 
and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction and if this matter were a final order, 
Case No. 900482 
Priority No. 16 
the appropriate jurisdiction would be with the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to 78-2-2 (j), Utah Code 
Annotated• 
Respondent has previously filed a Motion for 
Summary Disposition claiming this appeal is not from a 
final order. The Court denied the Motion by Minute 
Entry dated February 13, 1991, but reserved ruling on 
the issue for plenary presentation and consideration 
of the case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues to be considered on appeal are as 
follows: 
1. The Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury 
Verdict did not end the controversy between the 
parties and, therefore, is not an appealable final 
judgment. The standard of review is whether it is 
apparent on the face of the record that the 
controversy between the parties has been concluded in 
all respects. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 
P.2d 538 (Utah 1979). 
2. The District court was correct in setting 
aside the jury verdict by applying Florida law to the 
validity of the pre-nuptial agreement. The trial 
court standard must be based upon whether or not the 
moving party (in this case the Respondent) is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. In reviewing this 
decision, the Appellate Court gives no deference to 
the trial Court's legal conclusions, but reviews them 
for correctness. See Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 
17 (Utah 1988) . 
3. The other issues presented in appellant's 
brief concern the Court*s factual findings in 
connection with the application of Florida law. The 
standard for review is whether the findings of fact 
are clearly erroneous. See Barker v. Francis, 741 
P.2d 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE STATE STATUTES 
U.C.A. §75-2-201(2) 
Right to elective share. 
If a married person not domiciled in 
this state dies, the right, if any, 
of the surviving spouse to take an 
elective share in the property in this 
state is governed by the law of the 
decedent's domicile at death except as 
to provided in Subsection (3). 
F.S.A. 732.702 
Waiver of right to elect and of other 
rights. 
(1) The right of election of a 
surviving spouse, the rights of 
the surviving spouse as intestate 
successor or as a pretermitted 
spouse, and the rights of the 
surviving spouse to homestead, 
exempt property, and family 
allowance, or any of them, may be 
waived, wholly or partly, before 
or after marriage, by a written 
contract, agreement, or waiver, 
signed by the waiving party. 
Unless it provides to the contrary, 
a waiver of "all rights", or 
equivalent language, in the property 
or estate of a present or prospective 
spouse, or a complete property 
settlement entered into after, or in 
anticipation of, separation, 
dissolution of marriage, or divorce, 
is a waiver of all rights to elective 
share, intestate share, pretermitted 
share, homestead property, exempt 
property, and family allowance by 
each spouse in the property of the 
other and a renunciation by each of 
all benefits that would otherwise 
pass to either from the other by 
intestate succession or by the 
provisions of any will executed 
before the waiver or property 
settlement. 
(2) Each spouse shall make a fair 
disclosure to the other of his or 
her estate if the agreement, contract, 
or waiver is executed after marriage. 
No disclosure shall be required for 
an agreement, contract, or waiver 
executed before marriage. 
(3) No consideration other than the 
execution of the agreement, contract, 
or waiver shall be necessary to its 
validity, whether executed before or 
after marriage. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(This is a factual history of the case. It 
is presented here rather than under the Statement of 
Facts because it details the course of proceedings and 
nature of the case.) 
On February 19, 1987, the heirs of 
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Hemmert, M r , Hemmert 1s second wife, filed her F ^ L I L ; o n 
for Family Allowance. (R37,38) At the same time, she 
also filed a Notice of her intent, as the spouse of 
the deceased, to claim an elective share, thereby 
denouncing her right to take pursuant to the 
deceasedls Will. (R45) In her supporting Memorandum, 
she claimed that the pre-nuptial agreement she signed 
was void because she did not receive fair disclosure. 
On July 29, 1988, the Court granted appellant 
a $600.00 monthly family allowance. (R78) 
Thereafter, appellant petitioned the Court 
for additional expenses to cover the costs of 
emergency and serious dental problems. (R163,165) By 
Memorandum Decision dated October 11, 198 9, the Court 
authorized the incurrence of extra-ordinary medical 
expenses on behalf of the appellant and ordered the 
estate to pay for the same, reserving however the 
decision as to whether or not the expenses were a 
legitimate family expense and whether or not a 
reimbursement or offset to the estate of any amounts 
expended would be appropriate. (R229-231) 
On January 16, 1990, Attorney 
Michael J. Glasmann filed a Motion to Intervene 
claiming that he represented Michael L. Hemmert and 
Linda M. Hemmert, and that they possessed a special 
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disclosure and the pre-nuptial agreement was therefore 
invalid, (R355) 
Respondent had made a motion at the beginning 
of the trial to apply Florida law as to the question 
of the validity of the pre-nuptial agreement. There 
was a conference in chambers which referred to a 
conference call that had occurred the preceding Monday 
when the motion was initially made.. This exchange 
occurred during the in-chambers conference: 
MR. FLORENCE: 
To the extent that a record needs 
to be protected in advance of 
today*s jury trial and to the 
extent that Mr. Glasmann was not 
a party to that conference call 
and perhaps should have been, I 
wanted to restate and perhaps 
elaborate the motion that was 
made and the reasoning for it. 
All of the parties, through their 
counsel, appeared before this 
Court on March 13, 1990 at a 
pre-trial and settlement 
conference. Mr. Glasmann was 
here at that time, having 
previously filed a motion to 
intervene on behalf of one of 
the heirs, Michael Hemmert. 
There was considerable discussion 
at that hearing concerning the 
interpretation of Utah's elective 
share formula. The Court 
indicated at that time that it 
tended to construe that formula 
in the same manner as Mr. Glasmann 
had suggested it should be construed. 
As a result of that, the three of 
us once again appeared in front of 
this court on March 27th, 1990, two 
weeks later, in which there was a 
proposed settlement agreement 
entered into between all of the 
parties and which was going to 
comprise the respective claims 
based upon all of our various 
positions. 
On April 22nd, I believe, — 
strike that. Shortly thereafter 
Mr. Hadfield prepared and circulated 
to both Mr. Glasmann and myself a 
settlement agreement which 
incorporated in basic terms the 
agreement that was stated on the 
record on March 27th. On April the 
22nd, I believe, Mr. Hadfield wrote 
to me and to Mr. Glasmann informing 
us that his client wouldn't accept 
that proposal and suggested that it 
was determined that Mr. Hemmert was 
not a domicile of Utah but in fact 
a domicile of Florida and Florida's 
elective share would then apply, 
which would provide to her a much 
greater amount of Mr. Hemmertls 
estate than provided for under 
Utah*s elective share. 
I asked Mr. Hadfield to send me 
not only the evidence that he had 
to suggest that Mr. Hemmert was a 
domicile of Florida, but also to 
help persuade me that Florida law 
was indeed different as it related 
to the elective share. 
In May, and I have a letter here, 
but I think it was about May 15th, 
I received from Mr. Hadfield various 
documents which persuaded me that 
his argument that Mr. Hemmert was a 
domicile of Florida was strong. 
I called him about the Florida 
statutes and he indicated that he 
had not yet received those from the 
Florida lawyer whom he had been 
communicating with. Perhaps to my 
fault I waited too long before I 
undertook my own research on the 
Florida law, during which time it 
was discovered that if Florida 
law — that under Florida law the 
standard for the validity of a 
pre-nuptial agreement is different* 
The Utah standard requires fair 
disclosure. The Florida standard 
requires no disclosure at all, it 
only requires an execution of the 
pre-nuptial agreement. That was 
the purpose of my phone call on 
Monday, to suggest that if the 
petitioner in this case, Mrs. 
Hemmert, was going to take the 
position that Mr. Hemmert was a 
Florida domicile, if that was her 
position then Florida law ought to 
apply as to the validity of the 
pre-nuptial agreement. 
At that time Mr. Hadfield argued 
that Utah law should apply as to 
the validity of the pre-nuptial 
agreement since the pre-nuptial 
agreement was entered into in this 
state, the parties were married in 
this state, and most of the property 
was in this state. You expressed 
in that phone conference that you 
tended to agree with that and that 
would be your ruling. 
Since that time, Your Honor, I've 
had an opportunity to do some 
additional research, and very 
frankly it is a little scarce, 
but I have prepared for submittal 
to you an annotation from ALR 2nd, 
Volume 18, and two cases out of 
the state of Ohio — excuse me. 
One case out of the state of Ohio, 
1966, and one out of Wisconsin 
from 1959, which suggest that the 
place that the pre-nuptial 
agreement is prepared or executed 
is not a relevant — is not the 
only relevant factor to consider 
in deciding which law should 
apply to its validity, but that 
the matrimonial domicile would 
be the law to determine the 
validity of the pre-nuptial 
agreement, 
THE COURT: 
By matrimonial, do you mean the 
place of residence or the place 
of marriage? 
MR. FLORENCE: 
The place of residence during 
their marriage. We are prepared 
to concede that the matrimonial 
domicile, for purposes of this 
argument, was in fact Florida. 
That's where they lived together 
for most of their married life, 
although they did visit here 
during some of the summers, but 
that's where they considered 
their home to be was in the state 
of Florida. 
I would submit and urge the Court 
to once again reconsider its prior 
ruling and ask that the issue in 
this case be limited to whether or 
not Mrs. Hemmert executed the 
pre-nuptial agreement and if so 
rule as a matter of law that she 
is bound by the pre-nuptial 
agreement, because the Florida 
statute as to the fact that no 
disclosure is required would apply. 
I will leave with the Court the two 
cases I've referred to, the ALR 
citation as well as the Florida 
statute on the pre-nuptial agreement 
and some Florida cases that have 
confirmed that that's what they 
really mean. (T5-9) 
- i i -
Respondent's motion became necessary because 
for the entire extent of the proceedings up to just a 
few weeks before the trial, appellant had taken the 
position that the deceased was domiciled in the State 
of Utah and, therefore, Utah's elective share would 
apply. After the discussion with the Court at the 
hearing on March 13, 1990 when it appeared to the 
appellant that the elective share formula under Utah 
law would not favor her, she subsequently changed her 
position and then claimed the decedent was a domicile 
of Florida because, according to her, the Florida 
elective share law would be more advantageous. 
Therefore, the motion to apply Florida law to the 
validity of the pre-nuptial agreement did not come up 
until just before trial. As a result, additional 
discussion occurred with the Court. 
MR. FLORENCE: 
The problem with that argument, 
it sounded pretty good at the 
time Ben made it, but if the 
jury comes back and says there 
was fair disclosure, it's true 
that issue, as far as we're 
concerned, is now resolved 
whether you apply Utah law or 
Florida law. But if they don't, 
in my view then it's not a final 
judgment. He will have all kinds 
of collateral issues that you yet 
will need to resolve before 
kicking it up to the Supreme Court. 
So you're going to have one or two 
or perhaps three more trials or 
three more issues to be tried if 
we get to that posture, 
THE COURT: 
Such as you mean the family? 
MR. FLORENCE: 
Such as whether or not he was a 
domicile of Florida, if Florida 
law applies to the elective share. 
If it does not what was in the 
marital estate to apply the Utah 
elective share and what is 
Florida's elective share. I still 
haven't seen it. In due respect 
to Mr. Hadfield, I still haven't 
seen that authority. 
THE COURT: 
And then you have all the 
questions about the appropriate 
deductions which are being taken. 
MR. FLORENCE: 
And then the expenses of this 
estate. That's where Mr. 
Glasmann's primary concern comes 
in, whether or not half of it is 
in or half is out. 
THE COURT: 
It seems to me I'm being presented 
really with facts to determine 
that I don't have enough facts to 
determine as to the domicile. 
MR. GLASMANN: 
Could I intersect. I agree 
completely with Your Honor. I was 
trying to put myself in your shoes 
as to how you get yourself in a 
position to even instruct the jury 
in this case. It seems to me that 
logically the domicile issue has to 
be determined first. Then secondly 
you have to determine the conflict 
of laws question and then you have 
to instruct the jury. It is 
unfortunate that we're this far 
along with those issues unresolved. 
THE COURT: 
Since you called and since I was 
aware of the problem, I've been 
thinking, and it's catching me a 
little cold, too. I think you all 
recognize that. I have a jury 
sitting out there. I think I've 
got to, even taking your position, 
Ben, if we look at the most 
significant contacts and if we're 
applying Utah corporation law, I 
think, based on what I'm hearing 
today, there are some disputes 
about the significant contacts. 
If they're on a bus heading out 
of Utah and get married and that 
agreement is entered into ancillary 
to where they are really going to 
live, and plus they met in Florida 
and he lives in Florida, or at 
least arguably lives in Florida. 
(T16-18) 
After further discussion, it was agreed that 
the trial would proceed only on the issue of the 
validity of the pre-nuptial agreement. This exchange 
then occurred: 
THE COURT: 
That will give me time to do a 
little work on this issue. I might 
indicate to you that I think there 
are legitimate questions here. I 
do have some struggle, Ben. I was 
under the impression that there 
were a whole lot more contact here 
than now I'm being aware of. Maybe 
preliminarily there were on his 
part, but if she didn't ever live 
here, if she just came here for 
the purpose of helping him move, 
essentially, and while here they 
enter into this thing and enter 
into it here, and then leave and 
get married and are gone, then I 
really would want to read those 
cases and the law. 
MR, HADFIELD: 
And I think the evidence will 
show they did reside in Florida. 
They were back here every year to 
Utah together and they maintained 
an apartment 12 months a year 
here. So they still maintained 
significant contacts here. 
THE COURT: 
And I don't dispute that. 
MR. FLORENCEi 
I apologize about the lateness of 
this. I don't want to take all 
the blame because this thing has 
been pending for over two years 
and Mr. Hadfield didn't raise the 
issue of Florida law until three 
months ago. 
THE COURTi 
Nobody is affixing blame here, 
I'm only saying that we're all at 
a disadvantage now. I guess the 
buck stops here on the issue. 
MR. HADFIELD: 
I don't have any particular 
problem with Mr. Glasmann's 
participation in the argument 
here. You're not going to 
remain for the trial? 
MR. GLASMANNi 
There's just one other thing I 
want to say. Actually, when we 
withdrew the motion to intervene 
it was my understanding that the 
issues that would — the issue 
that would be tried here would 
be the issue of the validity of 
the pre-nuptial agreement only 
and that you would not be going 
into questions of what should 
be included in the estate or 
what should not. 
My client may testify, and I've 
talked with Brian about this so 
I'm sure he'll be objecting if 
Ben tried to go into matters 
that would be evidence on the 
issue of what should be included 
in the estate. I won't be here 
to object and I just wanted 
Your Honor to be aware that I 
don't feel it's fair that if my 
client does testify that they 
venture into whether this contract 
involves the Bushnell Motel and 
should it be included in the 
estate or not. 
MR. HADFIELD; 
They see the issue coming because 
it's big as a locomotive. If his 
client has a huge bias or self-
interest in the outcome of this 
lawsuit, the jury is entitled to 
know that. 
MR. FLORENCE! 
1*11 stipulate he does. 
MR. HADFIELD: 
A $290,000.00 interest. 
MR. GLASMANN: 
We agree that the jury is entitled 
to know there's that interest. I 
think the figures can be stated to 
the jury and we agree there's a 
bias, so that they are aware of 
that connection. But then to go 
into his testimony about the 
background on the contract, I 
would object to that happening 
without my being here. 
MR. HADFIELD: 
Maybe we can fashion some kind of 
stipulation. 
MR. FLORENCEi 
I think we can do that, yes. 
THE COURT: 
Okay. What I'd like you to do, 
then, is give me alternative 
instructions. The ones that I 
have are based on Utah law. If 
you'll just — they're just a 
very small part. If you111 give 
me the alternative instructions 
and then 1*11 give you my ruling. 
MR. FLORENCE: 
It would be my position at this 
time, Your Honor, that if you 
apply Florida law you can do that 
as a matter of law. She is not 
contesting she did not sign a pre-
nuptial agreement. 
MR. HADFIELD: 
You're saying in Florida if she 
speaks only Spanish and no English 
and puts her signature on that 
line? 
MR. FLORENCEz 
You have never alleged fraud or 
misrepresentation. You have 
alleged failure to disclose. 
MR. HADFIELD: 
If you look at our pleadings, all 
we've done is claim an elective 
share. I cited fraud in my 
memorandum, undue influence. I 
used both of those terms. 
THE COURT: 
I guess we'll just have to wait 
and see. If there's fraud in 
the procuring of the signature, 
then I suppose that's an issue 
that they'd have to rule on. 
MR. HADFIELD: 
Even in Florida. 
MR. FLORENCE! 
Let's go see what happens. 
(T21-25) 
After the trial, the parties were given 
additional time to brief their respective positions 
and on August 10, 1990, the Judge entered his 
Memorandum Decision setting aside the jury verdict and 
concluding that Florida law would apply. (R367-371) 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and an Order were prepared by the estate's counsel 
and submitted to appellant's counsel for review. A 
hearing was conducted before the Court on 
September 14, 1990, at which time the Court signed the 
Findings and Order in open court. (R383-397) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The factual setting of what was presented to 
the jury is not particularly relevant to these 
proceedings. The jury obviously made their decision 
based upon how they viewed the evidence presented. 
The primary factual aspect of this case that is 
relevant is contained in the Statement of the Case 
preceding this section. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This case is clearly not ripe for appeal. 
There are many issues yet to be decided. In any 
event, the Court was correct in applying Florida law 
in determining the validity of the pre-nuptial 
agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE JURY VERDICT 
DID NOT END THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
AND, THEREFORE, IS NOT AN APPEALABLE FINAL 
JUDGMENT. 
It is clear from the recitation of the 
history of this case that there are still several 
issues to be resolved. Michael Glasmann, who 
attempted to intervene on behalf of Michael Hemmert, 
is asserting a claim that the single largest asset of 
the estate, a motel, should not be included in the 
estate by reason of an agreement that he had with his 
father, the deceased, and the rest of the heirs. 
(R256-262) The resolution of that dispute will 
obviously affect appellant's share of the estate 
irrespective of the outcome of this appeal. Appellant 
contests the validity of the agreement Michael Hemmert 
claims to have had with the deceased and the other 
heirs. 
There is also the dispute as to whether or 
not the application of Floridafs law will change the 
amount available to appellant. She has claimed that 
Florida law prohibits a surviving spouse from 
receiving anything less than a fee interest in their 
residence. Mr. Hemmert's Will only gives her a life 
estate. 
The deceasedls Will contained a provision 
concerning the includability of his social security 
benefits and their deductibility from appellant's 
distributive share. Appellant has disputed the manner 
in which this would be included. The Will also 
contained a no-contest clause and since appellant 
contested the Will, its validity is yet to be 
resolved. 
Based upon the resolution of the social 
security benefits, there is also an issue as to 
whether or not appellant has exceeded the amount to 
which she is entitled by reason of her having received 
a substantial widow1s allowance since the death of 
Mr. Hemmert. 
There is also the issue that the Court 
reserved earlier about the includability and the 
appropriateness of the amended widow*s family 
allowance for the dental benefits paid to appellant. 
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure permits appeals from District Court "final 
orders and judgments". The jury trial, its verdict 
and the subsequent judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict have only addressed one issue out of the many 
yet to be resolved in this probate. Irrespective of 
the outcome of this appeal, if it is permitted at this 
time, other issues will still remain unsolved and 
subject to future appeals. While a decision of this 
Court may limit the number of other issues to be 
resolved, it does not change the fact that this case 
is not completed. 
For instance, if this Court concludes that 
the trial judge was correct in granting the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and that Florida law 
should have been applied to the validity of the 
pre-nuptial agreement and appellant is bound to take 
under the terms of the deceased*s Will, there are all 
of the potential issues referred to above still to be 
decided. 
On the other hand, if this Court should 
conclude that the Court erred in granting the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and that Utah law should 
be applied to the validity of the pre-nuptial 
agreement, then the jury verdict would be binding. 
That would still leave the issues of Florida1s law 
versus Utah's law as to the definition of appellant's 
elective share and the size of the estate by reason of 
the claim of Michael Hemmert and appellant's receipt 
of prior benefits. 
II 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN SETTING 
ASIDE THE JURY VERDICT AND APPLYING FLORIDA 
LAW AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE PRE-NUPTIAL 
AGREEMENT. 
Up until three months before trial, appellant 
had never suggested that the deceased was a domicile 
of Florida. She had always maintained her right to an 
elective share under Utah's elective share statute. 
(R45) When she raised that issue, it was because she 
believed that Florida's formula for calculating her 
elective share would be more beneficial to her. 
It then became apparent to the respondent 
that if Florida law were to be applied in determining 
an elective share, it should also be applied to the 
validity vel non of the pre-nuptial agreement. Since 
the issue was not raised until just before trial, the 
Court proceeded with the trial and reserved ruling on 
the "conflicts" question until the verdict was given. 
A different jury verdict would have made the issue 
moot. 
When it became necessary to rule, the Court 
entered specific findings as to the issue of domicile, 
as follows: 
3. That the petitioner is an 
immigrant from Hungary, having 
been previously married and 
divorced. She moved to the 
United States, having worked in 
Hungary as a secretary, including 
a secretary for a lawyer. She 
had lived in the United States for 
some period of time prior to 
meeting the deceased. She met the 
deceased who was vacationing in 
Florida and after a rather brief 
courtship, the two were married. 
4. That the deceased was a 
resident of Box Elder County and 
was previously married for some 
thirty (30) years, having had a 
family, his wife died and he began 
to travel. In the court of his 
travel, he met the petitioner in 
Florida where she resided. He 
subsequently returned to Florida 
where a brief courtship took place 
and then he returned to Utah. 
5. That the petitioner subsequently 
traveled to Utah for a period of 
time, maintaining her residence in 
Florida, but taking an apartment in 
Logan, Utah. She and the deceased 
received a marriage license in Cache 
County. A pre-nuptial agreement was 
prepared in Box Elder County and 
subsequently executed and notarized, 
as were accompanying Wills of the 
parties. The parties then traveled 
back to Florida to reside and were 
married in transit in Central/ 
Southern Utah. The parties set up 
the marital domicile and resided in 
Florida until the deceased*s death. 
(R385-386) 
^ *-\ 
The Judge also found: 
7. That it is uncontroverted that 
Florida law requires only that a 
pre-nuptial agreement be executed 
as contrasted with Utah law which 
requires adequate disclosure•... 
(R386) 
The Court's Conclusions of Law provided: 
1. That a review of the precedent 
submitted indicates that there is 
a differing approach established 
by many of the cases in the 
interpretation of marital contracts. 
This approach is, essentially, that 
the matrimonial domicile is a better 
indicated of the intention of the 
parties as to the interpretation 
and enforcement of contracts and 
relationships, in 11 ANJR Conflicts 
of Laws, Section 86, Page 273, it 
states in part that: 
Where the marriage takes 
place in the state in 
which the woman has been 
domiciled but, with the 
intention of the parties, 
which is carried out 
within a reasonable time, 
of establishing their 
common house in another 
state in which the 
husband is domiciled, 
the marital rights of 
the parties in the 
personal property of 
each other owned at the 
time of the marriage is 
governed, as a general 
rule, by the law of the 
state of their 
contemplated and 
subsequently established 
matrimonial domicile; 
such state is to be 
deemed their initial 
matrimonial domicile. 
This approach has been taken by 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 
Florida, Alabama, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Ohio and New York, 
although it is conceded that 
there is a difference of opinion 
among many Courts as to whether 
the validity of these agreements 
is to be determined by the law of 
the place where they are made or 
by the law of the matrimonial 
domicile. 
2. That the Court observes that 
there has been no claim, nor is 
there any evidence that there was 
fraud or misrepresentation in the 
initial entering into of the 
agreement and the Court 
specifically finds there was none. 
The petitioner's position is, 
essentially, that she was not 
informed sufficiently by virtue 
of the circumstances, including 
her language disabilities. 
3. That one of the closer cases 
that the Court could find bearing 
on this situation is the case of 
Osborn v. Osborn, 226 North Eastern 
Reporter 2d, Page 814, et. seq. 
When faced with a similar question, 
the Court there stated: 
The state is concerned 
in seeing that its 
concepts of public 
safety are enforced in 
this area because 
marriage is a status 
exclusively regulated 
and controlled by laws 
of the state of the 
parties• matrimonial 
domicile. 
The Court later stated: 
There can be little 
question that Ohio has 
the most significant 
contacts with and 
paramount interest in 
the parties, in the 
agreement, and in 
questions concerning 
its validity. In 
view of this conclusion, 
it is incumbent upon 
the Court to determine 
the validity of the 
antenuptial agreement 
under Ohio law dealing 
with this subject. 
In the Ohio case, there was a 
resident of Massachusetts and a 
resident of Ohio. The contract 
was executed in Massachusetts, 
but the parties subsequently 
resided in Ohio. This is a 
situation much like the instant 
case. 
4. That in determining the 
application of the law of the 
state of Utah to the facts of this 
case, it is helpful to the Court 
to refer to Section 75-2-201 [2], 
Utah Code Annotated, wherein it 
provides: 
If a married person 
not domiciled in this 
state dies, the right, 
if any, of the surviving 
spouse to take an 
elective share in 
property in this state 
is governed by the law 
of the decedent's domicile 
at death 
5. That the surviving spouses1 
right to take an elective share, 
which she is claiming, is dependent 
upon the validity of the pre-nuptial 
agreement. It appears to the Court 
that the intention of the Legislature 
of the state of Utah is consistent 
with that of what the Court finds to 
be the majority of the cases in the 
domestic conflict of law area and 
directs that those rights be 
determined under the law of the 
place of the decedent's domicile of 
death, which is consistent with the 
marital domicile of the parties in 
this case and that the public 
interests as stated in the Ohio case, 
are consistent with the statutory 
directive previously quoted. 
6. That the Court finds that Florida 
law is the applicable law and, as 
provided in Florida statute 732.702 
[1988] sub. 2: "No disclosure shall 
be required for an agreement, contract 
or waiver executed before marriage". 
7. That based on the foregoing, the 
Estate's Motion for Judgment Not 
Withstanding the Verdict be and is 
hereby granted. (R387-390) 
As the judge has indicated, the 
conflict-of-laws resolution really starts with the 
application of Utah law. It provides that: 
The right, if any, of the surviving 
spouse to take an elective share 
in property in this state is 
governed by the law of the 
decedent's domicile at death . . . " 
75-2-201(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
Appellant acknowledges that the decedent was 
a domicile of Florida at his death, but wants the 
Court to apply a different conflict-of-laws standard 
to this case and urges the significant contacts 
standard instead. This simply is not tenable in light 
of the Utah statute. 
This Court has therefore correctly applied 
the law in concluding that the Florida statute was the 
governing statute on the pre-nuptial agreement and 
disclosure is not required. 
Ill 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS FACTUALLY CORRECT IN 
THE MANNER IT APPLIED FLORIDA LAW TO THE 
PRE-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT. 
Appellant argues that even if the Court was 
going to apply Florida law, it erred in finding a 
"meeting of the minds" during the creation of the 
pre-nuptial agreement or in failing to find fraud in 
the inducement. 
In considering the extent to which the 
Florida courts would review pre-nuptial agreements in 
light of the absence of a disclosure requirement, it 
has been said that: 
If a wife were able to show that 
her signature on such an agreement 
had been coerced or otherwise 
improperly obtained or that she 
was incompetent at the time she 
signed, Section 732.702(2) would 
not bar her challenge to the 
validity of the agreement. 
Estate of Roberts, 388 So.2d 216, 
217 (Fla. 1980). 
While these issues were not presented to the 
jury, the Court specifically found no evidence of 
fraud or misrepresentation. Indeed, the Court found 
that appellant's only claim was that she was not 
informed sufficiently by virtue of the circumstances, 
including her language disabilities. (See Conclusions 
of Law #2) 
There were sufficient facts in this case to 
allow the Court to make that determination. 
Although appellant claims that she did not 
understand what she was signing when she signed the 
pre-nuptial agreement, she acknowledged in Answers to 
Interrogatories tht when she signed the agreement, 
Lyman told her that "they would both sign an agreement 
and she would be treated as a member of his family, 
just like his children". (Interrogatory answer #62, 
Exhibit D-6) This was true and exactly what happened 
under the terms of Mr. Hemmert's Will. 
Mr. Dorius, the attorney who prepared the 
pre-nuptial agreement and the Will, testified that 
prior to the time the agreement was signed, he had met 
with Mr. and Mrs. Hemmert and that she had brought in 
a paper that she had written out that she wanted to 
consider putting in the Will. "She was negotiating 
that she wanted put into the Will." (T170) 
Defendant's Exhibit 1 was introduced which 
was the paper Mr, Dorius said appellant brought to him 
for inclusion in the Will. (T170) 
Appellant acknowledged the document looked 
like her handwriting, but she did not remember when 
she made it. (T81) 
Mr. Dorius stated that she had also made some 
handwritten notes on the draft of the Will before the 
final was prepared. (T171) (Defendant's Exhibit 2) 
Appellant claimed she made those notes years 
after the pre-nuptial agreement was signed, but could 
not explain how she got an unsigned copy. (T83) 
Mr. Dorius also claimed that appellant had 
attorneys call him during the preparation phase of the 
documents to assist her in understanding. (T174) 
Appellant denied this. (T80) 
These issues and allegations were not 
necessarily conclusive, or even relevant, for the 
jury's consideration as to whether appellant received 
fair disclosure regarding Mr. Hemmert's assets. 
However, these facts could certainly be used by the 
Court in finding that there was no fraud or 
misrepresentation. Appellant cannot, by marshalling 
all of the evidence, demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the Court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous. Hagan v. 
Hagan, 158 UAR 66 (Utah App. 1991) 
CONCLUSION 
This case is not ripe for appeal. If 
reviewed, however, the trial Court was correct in its 
decision to set aside the jury verdict and apply 
Florida law on the validity of the pre-nuptial 
agreement. 
DATED this \Q -—day of May, 1991. 
Respectfully submitted, 
rLORENCE/-ftND HUTCHISON 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
Attorney for Respondent/ 
Personal Representative 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, 
postage prepaid, to Ben H. Hadfield, Attorney for 
Appellant, P.O. Box 8 76, Brigham City, UT 843 02, on 
this \£J^—aay of May, 1991. 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
LYMAN W. HEMMERT, aka, 
L. W. HEMMERT, 
Deceased. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Probate No. 873006067 
The above-entitled matter came on for jury trial on 
the 12th and 13th days of July, 1990, before the Honorable 
F. L. Gunnell, Judge of the above-entitled Court. The 
Personal Representative of the above estate, Alonna Cook, 
was present and represented by counsel, Brian R. Florence. 
The widow of Lyman W. Hemmert and petitioner herein, 
Rose Nagy Hemmert, was present and represented by counsel, 
Ben H. Hadfield. 
Immediately prior to trial, the Estate made a 
Motion for a Directed Verdict and/or Motion in Limine with 
the issue being the relevant law governing the 
determination of the validity of the pre-nuptial agreement. 
At that time, the Court denied the motion because there was 
insufficient time to address the issue appropriately and 
the Estate was given the right to renew the motion at the 
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conclusion of the trial. The instruction given to the jury 
by the Court essentially incorporated the law of the State 
of Utah as being the applicable law with reference to the 
interpretation of the Pre-Nuptial Agreement and that Utah 
law (UCA 75-2-204) required two (2) elements: 
1. A signed Pre-Nuptial Agreement* 
2. Fair disclosure prior to or incident to 
the signing of the Pre-Nuptial Agreement. 
After deliberation/ the jury found in favor of the 
petitioner finding that there was not adequate disclosure. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Estate renewed 
their motion in the form of a Motion for Judgment Not 
Withstanding the Verdict. The Court now having had an 
opportunity to review all of the material submitted in 
support and opposition to the Estate's motion, hereby files 
its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the position of the Petitioner is 
essentially that the matter is one of contract and that the 
principles of contract law apply and that the law of the 
jurisdiction where the contract was made controls; or the 
law where there were significant contacts with the parties 
The Matter of the Estate of: 
LYMAN W. HEMMERT 
Probate No. 873006067 
Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 
Page 3 
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and 
rftJTCHISOX 
ATTORNEYS AT 
LAW 
or the subject matter of the agreement should control. 
2. That the Estate's position is that in the areas 
of interpretation of Pre-Nuptial Agreements, the law is 
that the marital citus of the parties should control in the 
interpretation of the document. 
3. That the petitioner is an immigrant from 
Hungary, having been previously married and divorced. She 
moved to the United States, having worked in Hungary as a 
secretary, including a secretary for a lawyer. She had 
lived in the United States for some period of time prior to 
meeting the deceased. She met the deceased who was 
vacationing in Florida and after a rather brief courtship, 
the two were married. 
4. That the deceased was a resident of Box Elder 
County and was previously married for some thirty (30) 
years, having had a family, his wife died and he began to 
travel. In the course of his travel, he met the petitioner 
in Florida where she resided. He subsequently returned to 
Florida where a brief courtship took place and then he 
returned to Utah. 
5. That the petitioner subsequently traveled to 
Utah for a period of time, maintaining her residence in 
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Florida, but taking an apartment in Logan, Utah. She and 
the deceased received a marriage license in Cache County. 
A Pre-Nuptial Agreement was prepared in Bex Elder County 
and subsequently executed and notarized, as were 
accompanying Wills of the parties. The parties then 
traveled back to Florida to reside and were married in 
transit in Central/Southern Utah. The parties set up the 
marital domicile and resided in Florida until the 
deceased's death. 
6. That it is uncontroverted that the bulk of the 
decedent's property is in Utah with the exception of a 
condominium unit in Florida, and that during the course of 
the marriage, he frequently returned for periods of time to 
the state of Utah, County of Box Elder, to look after his 
business interests and holdings here while maintaining his 
domicile in Florida• 
7. That it is uncontroverted that Florida law 
requires only that a Pre-Nuptial Agreement be executed as 
contrasted with Utah' law which requires adequate 
disclosure. There is no Utah case law directly addressing 
the conflict of laws question presented in this case, 
however, precedent has been supplied by both parties in 
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support of their positions as previously outlined. 
From the foregoing Facts, the Court now makes and 
files its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That a review of the precedent submitted 
indicates that there is a differing approach established by 
many of the cases in the interpretation of marital 
contracts. This approach is, essentially, that the 
matrimonial domicile is a better indication of the 
intention of the parties as to the interpretation and 
enforcement of contracts and relationships, in 11 AWJR, 
Conflicts of Laws, Section 86, Page 273, it states in part 
that: 
Where the marriage takes place in the 
State in which the woman has been 
domiciled but, with the intention of 
the parties, which is carried out within 
a reasonable time, of establishing their 
common house in another State in which 
the husband is domiciled, the marital 
rights of the parties in the personal 
property of each other owned at the 
-time of the marriage is governed, as a 
general rule, by the law of the State 
of their contemplated and subsequently 
established matrimonial domicile; such 
State is to be deemed their initial 
matrimonial domicile. 
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This approach has been taken by the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin, Florida, Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Ohio and 
New York, although it is conceded that there is a 
difference of opinion among many Courts as to whether the 
validity of these agreements is to be determined by the law 
of the place where they are made or by the law of the 
matrimonial domicile. 
2. That the Court observes that there has been no 
claim, nor is there any evidence that there was fraud or 
misrepresentation in the initial entering into of the 
agreement and the Court specifically finds there was none. 
The petitioner's position is, essentially, that she was not 
informed sufficiently by virtue of the circumstances, 
including her language disabilities. 
3. That one of the closer cases that the Court 
could find bearing on this situation is the case of Osborn 
v. Osborn, 226 North Eastern Reporter 2d, Page 814, et. 
seq. When faced with a similar questions, the Court there 
stated: 
The State is concerned in seeing that 
its concepts of public safety are 
enforced in this area because marriage 
is a status exclusively regulated and 
controlled by laws of the State of the 
parties1 matrimonial domicile. 
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The Court later stated: 
There can be little question that Ohio 
has the most significant contacts with 
and paramount interest in the parties, 
in the agreement, and in questions 
concerning its validity. In view of 
this conclusion, it is incumbent upon 
the Court to determine the validity of 
the antenuptial agreement under Ohio 
law dealing with this subject. 
In the Ohio case, there was a resident of Massachusetts and 
a residence of Ohio. The contract was executed in 
Massachusetts, but the parties subsequently resided in 
Ohio. This is a situation much like the instant case. 
4. That in determining the application of the law 
of the State of Utah to the facts of this case, it is 
helpful to the Court to refer to Section 75-2-201 [2], Utah 
Code Annotated, wherein it provides: 
If a married person not domiciled in 
this State dies, the right, if any, 
of the surviving spouse to take an 
elective share in property in this 
State is governed by the law of the 
decedent's domicile at death 
5. That the surviving spouses' right to take an 
elective share, which she is claiming, is dependent upon 
the validity of the Pre-Nuptial Agreement. It appears to 
the Court that the intention of the Legislature of the 
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State of Utah is consistent with that of what the Court 
finds to be the majority of the cases in the domestic 
conflict of law area and directs that those rights be 
determined under the law of the place of the decedent's 
domicile at death, which is consistent with the marital 
domicile of the parties in this case and that the public 
interests as stated in the Ohio case, are consistent with 
the statutory directive previously quoted. 
6. That the Court finds that Florida Law is the 
applicable law and, as provided in Florida statute 732.702 
[1988] sub. 2: "No disclosure shall be required for an 
agreement, contract or waiver executed before marriage". 
7. That based on the foregoing, the Estate's 
Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict be and is 
hereby granted. / 
DATED this /A/ day of September, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
/^-*u-—**-<*<2 <L 
F. L. GUNNELL, Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BEN H. HADFIELD 
Attorney for Petitioner COOK/Q 
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STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
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The above-entitled matter came on for jury trial en 
the 12th and 13th days of July, 1990, before the Honorable 
F. L. Gunnel1, Judge of the above-entitled Court. The 
Personal Representative of the above estate, Alonna Cook, 
was present and represented by counsel, Brian R. Florence. 
The widow of Lyman W. Hemir.ert and petitioner herein, 
Rose Nagy Hemmert, was present and represented by counsel, 
Ben H. Hadfield. 
Immediately prior to trial, the Estate made a 
Motion for a Directed Verdict and/or Motion in Limine with 
the issue being the relevant law governing the 
determination of the validity of the pre-nuptial agreement. 
At that time, the Court denied the motion because there was 
insufficient time to address the issue appropriately and 
the Estate was given the right to renew the motion at the 
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conclusion cf the trial. The instruction given to the jury 
by the Court essentially incorporated the law of the State 
of Utah as being the applicable law with reference to the 
interpretation of the Pre-Nuptial Agreement and that Utah 
law (UCA 75-2-204) required two (2) elements: 
1. A signed Pre-Nuptial Agreement. 
2. Fair disclosure prior to or incident to 
the signing of the Pre-Nuptial Agreement. 
After deliberation, the jury found in favor of the 
petitioner finding that there was not adequate disclosure. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Estate renewed 
their motion in the form of a Motion for Judgment Not 
Withstanding the Verdict. The Court now having had an 
opportunity to review all of the material submitted in 
support and opposition to the Estate's motion and having 
heretofore signed and filed its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now orders as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a review of the precedent 
submitted indicates that there is a differing approach 
established by many of the cases in the interpretation of 
marital contracts. This approach is, essentially, that the 
matrimonial domicile is a better indication of the 
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intention of the parties as to the interpretation and 
enforcement of contracts and relationships, in 11 ANJR, 
Conflicts of Laws, Section 86, Page 273, it states in part 
that: 
Where the marriage takes place in the 
State in which the woman has been 
domiciled but, with the intention of 
the parties, which is carried out within 
a reasonable time, of establishing their 
common house in another State in which 
the husband is domiciled, the marital 
rights of the parties in the personal 
property of each other owned at the 
time of the marriage is governed, as a 
general rule, by the law of the State 
of their contemplated and subsequently 
established matrimonial domicile; such 
State is to be deemed their initial 
matrimonial domicile. 
This approach has been taken by the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin, Florida, Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Ohio and 
New York, although it is conceded that there is a 
difference of opinion among many Courts as to whether the 
validity of these agreements is to be determined by the law 
of the place where they are made or by the law of the 
matrimonial domicile. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court observes that 
there has been no claim, nor is there any evidence that 
there was fraud or misrepresentation in the initial 
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entering into of the agreement and the Court specifically • 
finds there was none. The petitioner's position is, 
essentially, that she was not informed sufficiently by 
virtue of the circumstances, including her language 
disabilities. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that one of the closer cases 
that the Court could find bearing on this situation is the 
case of Osborn v. Osborn, 226 North Eastern Reporter 2d, 
Page 814, et. seq. When faced with a similar questions, 
the Court there stated: 
The State is concerned in seeing that 
its concepts of public safety are 
enforced in this area because marriage 
is a status exclusively regulated and 
controlled by laws of the State of the 
parties' matrimonial domicile. 
The Court later stated: 
There can be little question that Ohio 
has the most significant contacts with 
and paramount interest in the parties, 
in the agreement, and in questions 
concerning its validity. In view of 
this conclusion, it is incumbent upon 
the Court to determine the validity of 
the antenuptial agreement under Ohio 
law dealing with this subject. 
In the Ohio case, there was a resident of Massachusetts and 
a residence of Ohio. The contract was executed in 
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Massachusetts, but the parties subsequently resided in 
Ohio. This is a situation much like the instant case. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in determining the 
application of the law of the State of Utah to the facts of 
this case, it is helpful to the Court to refer to Section 
75-2-201 [2], Utah Code Annotated, wherein it provides: 
If a married person not domiciled in 
this State dies, the right, if any, 
of the surviving spouse to take an 
elective share in property in this 
State is governed by the law of the 
decedent's domicile at death 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the surviving spouses1 
right to take an elective share, which she is claiming, is 
dependent upon the validity of the Pre-Nuptial Agreement. 
It appears to the Court that the intention of the 
Legislature of the State of Utah is consistent with that of 
what the Court finds to be the majority of the cases in the 
domestic conflict of law area and directs that those rights 
be determined under the law of the place of the decedent's 
domicile at.death, which is consistent with the marital 
domicile of the parties in this case and that the public 
interests as stated in the Ohio case, are consistent with 
the statutory directive previously quoted. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court finds that 
Florida Law is the applicable law and, as provided in 
Florida statute 732.702 [1988] sub. 2: "No disclosure 
shall be required for an agreement, contract or waiver 
executed before marriage". 
IT'IS FURTHER ORDERED that based on the foregoing, 
the Estate's Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the 
Verdict be and is hereby granted. 
DATED this Ay-^day of September, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
F. 1. GUNNELL, Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BEN H. HADFIELD 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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